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INTRODUCTION
1

From the moment it was made public on February 5, 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s judicial reorganization, or “Court-Packing Plan,”
has captured the interest and imagination of journalists, historians,
political scientists, the legal academy, and the public at large, not to
mention the President, members of Congress, and the Supreme
2
Court. Whether one subscribes to the conventional narrative which
∗
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identifies the Court-Packing Plan as the impetus for the Court’s shift
3
on politically-charged constitutional questions, or the counternarrative which argues that the Court’s internal dynamics of doctrinal
development, not the Court-Packing Plan, caused the Court to
4
change its position on New Deal legislation, there is no doubt that
the Court-Packing Plan represents an important episode in American
history.
The Plan well deserves this status, not just for the role it played in
the 1930s, but for the role it continues to play in contemporary constitutional politics. In the 1930s, the Court-Packing Plan forced Congress to develop an institutional response to the President, which,
among other things, realigned the balance of power among the political branches. The Plan operated to de-personalize the office of the
President by separating the charisma and character of the man from
5
the powers and limitations of the office. It allowed Congress to reas6
sert its power vis-à-vis the President, but it also created factions within
7
the Democratic Party. Finally, the Plan’s failure created a de facto
bar on future attempts to reorganize the Supreme Court, arguably al-

3

4

5

6

7

See, e.g., ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 2 at 140–41; BAKER, supra note 1, at 174 (“The
Administration naturally believed the shift in the Court’s philosophy was a riposte to Roosevelt’s original thrust on February 5.”).
See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 2, at 4–5; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at xxii, xxiii (acknowledging that “[t]he older versions [of interpretations of the Court-packing fight] tried to establish a direct link between the 1936 election, the court bill, the ‘switch in time’ theory,
and ‘constitutional revolution’ of 1937,” but arguing that these events “had no bearing on
the decisions reached by the justices in subsequent cases coming before them for review”); id. at xxv–xxvi (discussing how conventional accounts of constitutional history began to attach political labels to individual Justices in the 1930s, whether or not they were
appropriate, causing the “whole of judicial decision making in the 1930s [to have become] distorted to fit [a] modernist [political label]” (citing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 300 (2000))); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 205–08 (1994).
See, e.g., MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS 22–26 (1937) (noting Roosevelt’s
vigorous attack upon the Supreme Court in his March 4th address at the Democratic Victory Dinner. Pusey contrasts this with reaction to Roosevelt’s speech: “No doubt this line
of approach produced many emotional reactions in favor of the discipline which the
President wishe[d] to administer to our highest tribunal.”).
See, e.g., SHESOL, supra note 2, at 457–58 (“Roosevelt’s relationship with Congress was
worse than it had ever been . . . . What had begun as a struggle between the president and
the Court was now a struggle between the president and Congress. . . . [One Senator
commented,] ‘We have retreated from one battle to the other during the last four
years . . . . But this is Gettysburg.’”); SOLOMON, supra note 2, at 4 (“[T]he opposition
sprung up immediately and mounted a sustained attack on the Court bill that left it little
chance of succeeding.”); Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, The New Deal, and The
American Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723, 737 (1984).
See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 1, at 97–99; SHESOL, supra note 2, at 525.
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lowing the Court the security necessary to transform itself into a powerful force for social change.
However, it is the Court-Packing Plan’s role as a rhetorical device—its symbolism—that is of greatest interest to me and is the subject of this Article.
When we think of rhetoric, we immediately think of Aristotle, who
extended the study of rhetoric beyond Plato’s criticism of it as “im8
moral, dangerous, and unworthy of serious study.” Aristotle taught
that rhetoric was a valuable tool for rational inquiry about experi9
ence, which could then lead to knowledge. He viewed rhetoric as a
system of persuasion based on knowledge, not as a cynical exercise of
10
factual manipulation, and he believed it could be useful in resolving
11
practical problems.
Unfortunately, the word “rhetoric” has suffered a serious decline
in popular perception. To some, rhetoric has come to describe language that is empty, willfully deceitful, and just plain dishonest. But
this popular perception is incomplete, as there is value in a rhetorical
12
orientation, especially when applied to judicial opinions. To make
use of all that a rhetorical orientation toward judicial opinions can
offer, one must look at rhetoric as something other than a way of
dressing up lies and making poor decisions sound respectable; and
one must approach judges not just as legal decisionmakers, but as
writers. In this context, rhetoric describes the way a judge uses or arranges language to persuade a particular audience. How a judge uses
and arranges language often reveals the underlying assumptions in
his or her arguments; and understanding these assumptions is critical
to forming an intelligent response to the legal opinion in question. A
rhetorical analysis of a judicial opinion is important because what a

8
9
10

11

12

PLATO, LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS 319 (Jeffrey Henderson ed., W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard Univ. Press (1925)) (1967).
ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC 1355b (H.C. Lawson-Tancred trans., 1991).
ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC 1354a (H.C. Lawson-Tancred trans., 1991) (“For
speakers ought not to distract the judge by driving him to anger, envy or compassion—
that would be rather as if one were deliberately to make crooked a ruler that one was intending to use.”).
Cf. GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION
FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 77–78 (1980) (outlining several components of Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric and their intended effects and applications).
In this, I am not alone. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2008 (2002) (“Increasingly, though, I have begun to think that this
functional approach [to dealing with Supreme Court opinions] is overlooking a crucial
aspect of Supreme Court decisions: their rhetoric. . . . I believe that we can gain new insights about the Court and constitutional law by looking at the opinions from a rhetorical
perspective.”).
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judge decides as a legal reality is shaped by the words he or she uses.
What judges say is inescapably a product of how they say it.
***

To understand the rhetorical significance of the Court-Packing
Plan, I asked, “What do we talk about when we talk about the CourtPacking Plan?” The answer I discovered is: it depends.
I reviewed Supreme Court and lower federal court cases that cited
to the episode. Tracing the rhetorical journey of the Court-Packing
Plan, I learned that federal courts do employ it as a symbol, though
not always in the same way. Scholars refer to the controversy surrounding the Court-Packing Plan using various phrases, including,
14
15
“Court-packing fight,” “constitutional crisis of 1937,” and “constitu16
tional revolution of 1937.” The two predominant phrases used by
federal courts, however, are “Court-Packing Plan” and “switch in time
that saved nine.”17 In judicial opinions, the event functions as a linguistic trope—a rhetorical figure of speech—to further an underlying
institutional argument. Generally speaking, courts tend to use the
term “Court-packing” to signify external threats to the Court’s legitimacy and the term “switch in time” to signify internal threats to the
Court’s legitimacy. The “Court-Packing Plan” language is used to
make broader arguments about judicial independence and the need
to protect the judiciary as an institution. The “switch in time” lan13

14

15
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Id. at 2010 (“[T]he opinions written by the Justices and issued by the Court are a central,
not an incidental, aspect of American constitutional law and that focusing on the opinions as rhetoric can help us to understand and appraise the Supreme Court’s work.”).
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 256 (2002); Gerard N. Magliocca, CourtPacking and the Child Labor Amendment, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 460 (2011); L.A. Powe,
Jr., The Court’s Constitution, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 536 (2010).
See, e.g., James A. Henretta, Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Liberal America, 24
LAW & HIST. REV. 115, 137 (2006); Nancy Staudt & Yilei He, The Macroeconomic Court:
Rhetoric and Implications of New Deal Decision-Making, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 87, 88 (2010);
George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of the O’Connor Court: Professor Thomas M. Keck
Vindicated, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 151, 210 (2008).
See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 4, at 204; Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie
with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 855
(2010); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 771 (2009);
G. Edward White, Response, The Lost Origins of American Judicial Review, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1145, 1148 (2010).
For examples of use of the phrases “Court-Packing Plan” and “switch in time saves nine,”
see e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL (1998); WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); David E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save
Nine?, 2 J. Legal Analysis 69 (2010).
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guage is used to make broader arguments about proper restraints on
the Court’s interpretive methodology.
In this Article, I begin by laying a basic theoretical foundation for
understanding how language choice provides contextual cues to direct interpretation. Next, I analyze cases that use the “Court-Packing
Plan” language. I argue that these references are intended to trigger
a response in the reader that is sympathetic to judicial independence
and, in some instances, to judicial incursions into policymaking. I
then analyze references to the “switch in time” language, extracting
the arguments about constitutional methodology and judicial activism embedded in that phrase. Here, I argue that the phrase “switch
in time” is deployed to remind the reader of what happens when the
Court overreaches and finds it necessary to radically change course or
risk permanent institutional damage. Finally, I consider the implications of using both of these phrases in the same opinion. I contend
that attention to language choice uncovers how the judiciary uses the
institutional clash of the 1930s as a rhetorical tool and reveals how
this episode in America’s political and legal history entered our culture of argument about our system of government and the role of the
judiciary as a constitutional decision-making body within that system.
I. THEORETICAL GROUNDING: AGENDA-SETTING, AGENDA-EXTENSION,
AND FRAMING ANALYSIS
18

“Judicial opinions are rhetorical performances.” Federal jurists
often use rhetoric in judicial opinions “as a tool to stay within the
constraints placed upon them by law” while giving them “some room
19
to develop the law in certain ways.” As an actor in a rhetorical performance, the judicial opinion writer is concerned with, among other
things, “persuading the audience and demonstrating a certain au20
thority over it.” In this regard, understanding approaches to rhetorical analysis—in particular, rhetorical analysis of the media—is instructive.
A common approach used by communication researchers to study
the press and other media is called framing analysis. This approach
allows communication researchers to study how the press’s publication choices may effectively set an agenda by presenting the general
18
19
20

Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 187 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
Ruth C. Vance, Judicial Opinion Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 17 J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 197, 226 (2011).
Levinson, supra note 18, at 187.
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public with a confined number of topics to think about. The informal beginning of this approach is traced to a statement made by Bernard C. Cohen in 1963. Cohen remarked, “[the press] may not be
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is
21
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”
“[T]he world looks different to different people,” Cohen continued,
“depending . . . on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, edi22
tors, and publishers of the papers they read.” This idea formally developed into a theory of agenda-setting by Dr. Maxwell E. McCombs
and Dr. Donald L. Shaw in their study of the 1968 presidential election. In their studies, Maxwell and Shaw found that voters learn
about an issue in direct proportion to the attention given that issue
23
by the press. Broadly speaking, the agenda-setting theory posits that
the media exerts a tremendous influence in telling the general public
what to think and in so doing obtains the ability to direct and affect
24
political decisionmaking.
This initial understanding of agenda-setting—telling the public
what to think about—developed into a secondary understanding of
25
agenda-extending—telling the public how to think about it. Specifically, agenda-extending focuses beyond the subjects of the news stories the media provides to the general public and concentrates on the
26
“contextual cues or frames in which to evaluate those subjects.”
Framing analysis provides one approach for investigating and understanding how the process moves from agenda-setting to agenda27
extending. According to William Gamson, a frame provides contextual cues through which the reader, listener, or audience may interpret the particular facts of a subject: “[facts] take on their meaning
by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and
gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ig-

21
22
23

24
25

26
27

BERNARD C. COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 13 (1963).
Id.
Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, Agenda-Setting and the Political Process, in DONALD
L. SHAW & MAXWELL E. MCCOMBS, THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL ISSUES: THE
AGENDA-SETTING FUNCTION OF THE PRESS 149, 153 (1977).
Jim A. Kuypers, Framing Analysis, in RHETORICAL CRITICISM: PERSPECTIVES IN ACTION 181,
182 (Jim A. Kuypers ed., 2009).
See, e.g., Anne Johnston, Trends in Political Communication: A Selective Review of Research in
the 1980s, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: A RESOURCE BOOK 329, 337
(David L. Swanson & Dan Nimmo eds., 1990).
Id. (citing Shanto Iyengar et al., Experimental Demonstrations of the “Not-So-Minimal” Consequences of Television News Programs, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 848, 848–58 (1982)).
Kuypers, supra note 24, at 185.
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28

noring others.” This emphasis and de-emphasis makes some information more accessible to the audience, privileging some information or viewpoints over others, thereby creating a hierarchy of sali29
ent information that in turn constructs a particular reality. The
remainder of this Article analyzes the judiciary’s use of the “Courtpacking” and “switch in time” language and considers the implications of choosing one frame over the other to describe the 1937 institutional clash initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s judicial reorganization proposal.
II. REFERENCE TO THE COURT-PACKING PLAN TO ADVANCE AN
ARGUMENT FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The 1937 institutional clash quietly entered judicial discourse. It
began its rhetorical journey as an implicit reference in a concurring
opinion. However, it has since developed into a valuable rhetorical
tool. This section traces that development and discusses how judicial
writers have appropriated the historical moment to advance an argument about judicial independence. In particular, this section considers how the choice to frame the 1937 clash as a “Court-Packing
Plan” acts as a defense of judicial independence against external attack.
A. Justice Frankfurter’s Concurrence in Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v.
Sawyer: The Power of the Implicit Historical Reference
In 1939, Franklin Roosevelt nominated Harvard Law professor Fe30
lix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court. It has often been said that
Frankfurter filled the vacancy known as the scholar’s seat, given that
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Benjamin Cardozo were its
31
two former occupants. Although breaking with tradition and re-

28
29
30

31

William A. Gamson, News As Framing: Comments On Graber, 33 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 157,
157 (1989).
Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J. COMM., Dec.
1993, at 51, 53.
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 214
(2009); PETER CHARLES HOFFER ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 267
(2007).
HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH vii–viii (1960);
Melvin I. Urofsky, Essay, William O. Douglas As A Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133, 150
n.118 (1992) (“The scholar’s seat was the common appellation used in the 1930s and
1940s to refer to the seat held by Frankfurter and his predecessors. Horace Gray, who
taught at the Harvard Law School, held the seat from 1881 to 1902; he was succeeded by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who served until 1932. The scholarly Benjamin Nathan
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quiring the nominee to testify before the Senate Judiciary Commit32
tee—the first time since 1925 —the Senate confirmed Frankfurter
33
without dissent. In his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, Frankfurter made the first, albeit oblique, reference to the
34
Court-Packing Plan found in any federal court opinion. Although
Frankfurter’s concurrence was largely immaterial to the outcome of
35
the litigation, the case presented him with a rare opportunity to discuss the analytical framework of separation of powers issues in general and executive action in particular. Thus, Frankfurter felt com36
pelled to write.
Youngstown Sheet is perhaps the best known of the Court’s presi37
dential power cases. In 1952, in the midst of the Korean War, President Truman ordered Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize
and operate most of the nation’s steel mills as a means of mitigating
the effects of a potential strike by the United Steelworkers of Ameri38
ca. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have
39
authority to issue such an order. Writing for the majority, Justice
Black said that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue the order

32

33

34
35

36

37
38
39

Cardozo replaced Holmes, and Cardozo was replaced by Professor Felix Frankfurter in
1939.”).
Paul Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146,
1158 & n.54 (1988) (noting that with the exception of Justice Stone in 1925, questioning
of a Supreme Court nominee began with Felix Frankfurter in 1939: “There was one exception to the old practice [of not questioning nominees]. In 1925, the Committee allowed Harlan F. Stone to appear in order to explain his conduct as Attorney General in
declining to dismiss an indictment, believed to have been politically inspired, brought by
his predecessor against Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana. The questioning was limited to that issue, and Stone evidently emerged with his position strengthened.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 426
(2010) (commenting that “Frankfurter was the first Justice ever ‘invited’ by the [Senate
Judiciary] Committee” to give testimony and answer questions).
FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 163; PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT:
THE MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR CONSTITUTION
328 (2000).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 589 (“Although the considerations relevant to the legal enforcement of the principle of separation of powers seem to me more complicated and flexible than may appear
from what Mr. Justice Black has written, I join his opinion because I thoroughly agree
with the application of the principle to the circumstances of this case.”).
Id. at 589 (“Even though such differences in attitude toward this principle may be merely
differences in emphasis and nuance, they can hardly be reflected by a single opinion for
the Court. Individual expression of views in reaching a common result is therefore important.”).
Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 233,
233 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 582–83.
Id. at 585.
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must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
40
itself.” The Court found that no statute authorized the President’s
seizure, and the power to seize the mills was not implicit in the execu41
tive’s Article II powers granted by the Constitution.
Although Frankfurter joined the majority, he wrote separately to
explain the independent basis for his agreement with the overall result. Rather than recount the facts of the case, Frankfurter used the
first eight paragraphs of his concurrence to set the tone and frame
the topic for the rest of his opinion. In the first sentence of the second paragraph, Frankfurter wrote:
[The Founders of this Nation] rested the structure of our central government on the system of checks and balances. For them the doctrine of
separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity. Not so
long ago it was fashionable to find our system of checks and balances obstructive to effective government. It was easy to ridicule that system as
42
outmoded—too easy.

The first thing to note about this passage is the implicit nature of the
allusion to the Court-Packing Plan. Nowhere in this passage does
Frankfurter expressly cite to the Court-packing episode by name. Rather, the reader must rely on the linguistic cues Frankfurter uses to
draw the connection.
The first such cue is the placement of the phrase “not so long
ago” in the same sentence as the word “obstructive.” Beginning in
1935, during Roosevelt’s first term, the Supreme Court repeatedly
struck down New Deal legislative measures aimed at economic recov43
ery as being outside the scope of the federal government’s power.
Throughout this period, Roosevelt voiced his frustration with these
decisions. He referred to these decisions—and to the Justices who
made them—as obstructionist, political, and an impediment to the
44
government’s recovery efforts.
The second linguistic cue is con40
41
42
43

44

Id.
Id. at 587–88.
Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 unconstitutional); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(holding the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional); Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (holding the Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional);
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S.
330 (1935) (holding the Railroad Retirement Act unconstitutional); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (holding § 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
unconstitutional).
In one of his famous Fireside Chats, Roosevelt described the problem of the obstructionist Supreme Court that had prompted his proposal to reorganize the judiciary: “Last
Thursday I described the American form of Government as a three horse team provided
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tained in the passage’s statement that “[i]t was easy to ridicule that
45
system [of checks and balances] as outmoded . . . .” This alludes to
Roosevelt’s effort to denigrate the Court in the media, where he famously said that the Hughes Court’s position on economics was
46
trapped in the “horse-and-buggy” era. Roosevelt’s use of this term
was to paint the Court’s economic philosophy (and by implication
their decisions striking down New Deal economic legislation) as outdated and wholly unsuited to resolve the modern-day financial crisis.
By using the words “ridicule,” and “outmoded,” Frankfurter is able to
remind his readers of Roosevelt’s attempt to destabilize the Court in
the name of economic necessity and to capitalize on the symbolic
power associated with the triumph of the tripartite system of checks
and balances in the 1937 Court battle.
Frankfurter’s decision to refer to the Court-Packing Plan by implicit allusion can be understood in at least three ways. First, Youngstown Sheet is a separation of powers case, and the greatest separation
of powers clash up to 1952 was Roosevelt’s 1937 attempt to legislative47
ly “reorganize” the federal judiciary. Given this similarity and the
fact that these events were separated by a mere fifteen years, it was
reasonable for Frankfurter to assume his target audience—i.e., the
upper-crust of legal professionals—would pick up on his reference to
the earlier separation of powers clash. Second, by alluding to the
Court-Packing Plan through the euphemism of separation of powers

45
46

47

by the Constitution to the American people so that their field might be plowed. The
three horses are, of course, the three branches of government—the Congress, the Executive and the Courts. Two of the horses are pulling in unison today; the third is not. . . . In
the last four years the sound rule of giving statutes the benefit of all reasonable doubt has
been cast aside. The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making
body. When the Congress has sought to stabilize national agriculture, to improve the
conditions of labor, to safeguard business against unfair competition, to protect our national resources, and in many other ways, to serve our clearly national needs, the majority
of the Court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom of these Acts of the
Congress—and to approve or disapprove the public policy written into these laws.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat (Mar. 9, 1937), available at http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15381.
Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Two Hundred and Ninth Press Conference. May 31, 1935, in 4 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE COURT DISAPPROVES,
1935, at 200, 221 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
The text of the bill and accompanying messages from Roosevelt and Attorney General
Homer S. Cummings are printed at 81 CONG. REC. 876, 876–80 (1937). The bill’s most
controversial provision permitted the President to appoint an additional Justice to the
Supreme Court for each sitting Justice who did not retire within six months of his seventieth birthday. Id. at 880. If passed, the President would have been able to appoint six
additional Justices immediately, as six sitting Justices on the Court fit the provision’s criterion.
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language, Frankfurter was able to depersonalize the Court’s ruling,
48
which was to declare President Truman’s action unconstitutional.
Or, to put it differently, Frankfurter would have been unable to maintain his respectful tone toward President Truman had he explicitly
compared the steel mill seizures to Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan;
yet he wanted to make the connection to establish the Court’s right
and authority to rule on the actions of the executive branch. It is interesting to note how Frankfurter accomplishes this delicate form of
argumentative staging. The passage is structured to preempt criticism that the Court in Youngstown was simply being obstructionist by
framing the issue within the broader scheme of the system of checks
and balances. Finally, Frankfurter’s rhetorical choice allows him to
avoid having to characterize the 1937 incident in any particular way—
either as the “Court-Packing Plan” or “the switch in time that saved
nine.” In this way, he avoids committing to a loaded phrase or identifying with one camp or the other. By not committing to either
phrase, he avoids signaling disrespect for the President and venerating the judiciary or demeaning the judiciary and exalting the Executive. The implicit allusion allows him to characterize the historical
event on his own terms and thereby hover well above the cultural debate about the incident and instead use it to make his point about the
larger separation of powers issue.
As Frankfurter presents the issue, it is not that the Court wants to
interfere in the relationship between Congress and the President; rather, the system of checks and balances requires that the Court render
a decision. Thus, defending the scope of the judiciary’s power per se
is incidental to protecting the larger structural scheme. Again, for
Frankfurter the question is not whether the Court wants to oppose
the President or wants to define the power boundary between the political branches; rather, the question is whether the Court, as an essential component of the checks and balances system, must exercise
49
its duty to “say [sic] what the law is.” In this way, the Court-Packing
Plan—although never identified by name—operates as a recognizable
symbol of the need to protect the Court’s position within the tripartite structure of American government.
Frankfurter’s language choices also argue for a long view when assessing the Court’s role vis-à-vis the political branches, even when the
Court’s decisions appear in the short-term to be obstinate or ignorant
of political realities. For example, he writes: “[n]ot so long ago it was
48
49

Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 587.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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fashionable to find our system of checks and balances obstructive to
50
effective government.” The word “fashionable,” as used in this context, functions as a constitutional pejorative. It denotes things that
are ephemeral and shallow, as fashion trends and tastes are constantly changing, rising and falling at the whim of a momentarily stimulated public. In addition, particular fashions become trends because
they have mass appeal, which is not necessarily a bad thing, except
that in the context of constitutional adjudication, it feels a bit like
mob rule. Things that are “fashionable” tend to follow a wellestablished and cyclical pattern: (1) rapid purchase—bordering on
the viral—by the masses soon after introduction into the market, (2)
consumer accumulation at a rate where the incidences of purchase
are exceedingly disproportionate to the length of time elapsed, (3)
product saturation in the market, and (4) displacement of product A
with newly introduced product B, beginning a new cycle. The mechanics of this type of cycle imply that the public has not been especially thoughtful about the reasons for buying into the trend or the
long-term consequences of following it. By relating the fleeting cycle
of fashion to the public’s willingness to disparage our tri-institutional
system, Frankfurter is able to point out that even if the public does
not like a particular decision (or set of decisions) of the Court, there
is more at stake, namely the durability and stability of the American
scheme of republican government.
As I will show below, however, judicial references to the CourtPacking Plan were never again as subtle as the one crafted by Frankfurter in Youngstown Sheet. This is probably because the authors of
these later opinions could not assume, as Frankfurter did, that their
target audience would pick up on the shadow reference to the CourtPacking Plan—its implied symbolism—by mere language cues alone;
too much time elapsed between 1937 and the date these subsequent
cases came to the Court. The judges who wrote the later opinions
would need to allude to the “Court-Packing Plan” or the “switch in
time” more directly, or risk that their references would hang in the
ether between reader and writer, ungrasped or misunderstood. As a
result, however, they lost some of the flexibility Frankfurter maintained for himself. That is, they had to choose a camp and commit
openly to a position with respect to the Court’s power to review and
strike down actions of the political branches. The Court-Packing
Plan, as a symbol, became at once more powerful and unwieldy.

50

Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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B. Justice Brennan’s Dissent in National League of Cities v. Usery:
Using the “Court-Packing Plan” Trope as a Warning of Possible
External Threats to the Judiciary
51

In 1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery, Justice William Brennan made the first explicit reference to the Court-Packing Plan in a
Supreme Court opinion, and he did so to criticize the majority for interfering with the policymaking function of Congress. Contained
within a dissent strongly critical of the Court’s decision in National
League, Brennan appealed to the 1937 incident as a warning to all
concerned—but especially his brethren on the Court—of what happens when the judicial branch unduly impedes legislative action and
thereby invites retaliation from the political branches.
In 1974, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) to extend coverage of the minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions to nearly all public employees employed by states and
52
their political subdivisions. In National League, numerous states and
their political subdivisions challenged these amendments asserting a
53
claim of intergovernmental immunity. In a 5-4 decision, the Court
held that while the general subject matter of wages and hours is with54
in the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, Congress may
not regulate the wages and hours set by a state as an employer, because
federal law operated to “directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func55
tions.” The majority’s decision in National League reinvigorated the
56
Tenth Amendment as a defense to federal action by concluding that
the 1974 FLSA Amendments interfered with traditional aspects of
state sovereignty. Invoking the ultimate personification of judicial integrity, Brennan’s dissent begins by placing the majority’s decision in
direct opposition to Chief Justice John Marshall:
It must therefore be surprising that my Brethren should choose this bicentennial year of our independence to repudiate principles governing
judicial interpretation of our Constitution settled since the time of Mr.
Chief Justice John Marshall, discarding his postulate that the Constitution contemplates that restraints upon exercise by Congress of its plenary

51
52
53
54
55
56

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id. at 836.
Id. at 836–37.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 852.
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively . . . .”).
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commerce power lie in the political process and not in the judicial pro57
cess.

This passage frames the rest of Brennan’s dissent. Framing “is the
process whereby communicators act—consciously or not—to construct a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given
58
situation to be viewed in a particular manner . . . .” Frames are “central organizing ideas within a narrative account of an issue or event;
59
they provide the interpretive cues for otherwise neutral facts.”
Framing allows the author to construct a narrative that will persuade
60
readers to recognize and adopt their line of argument. Frames assist
both the author and the audience in “defin[ing] problems . . . diagnos[ing] causes . . . mak[ing] moral judgments . . . and
61
sugges[ting] remedies.” Robert Entman, Professor at The George
Washington School of Media and Public Affairs, notes “text contains
frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain
keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information,
and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts
62
or judgments.” Examples of framing devices include: metaphors,
exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images. Here, Justice
Brennan uses the image of John Marshall—a Revolutionary War veteran and “father” of the Supreme Court—to draw a causal connection between American independence and the limited scope of judi63
cial review. One might argue further that judicial independence, as
evoked by Marshall in his most famous opinion—Marbury v. Madison—is possible only where the judiciary operates within the limited

57
58
59
60

61
62
63

Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Kuypers, supra note 24, at 182.
Id.
For examples discussing the differential effects of framing, see PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET
AL., REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 52 (1991) (considering the issue of mandatory testing for HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and
finding that a majority of the public supported the rights of persons with AIDS (acquired
imuno-deficiency syndrome) against mandatory testing when framed as a civil liberties issue, but that the majority supported mandatory testing when framed as a public health issue); Thomas E. Nelson et al., Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effects on Tolerance, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 577–79 (1997) (concluding that audiences expressed
more tolerance for a Ku Klux Klan march when framed as a free speech issue than when
framed as a disruption of public order issue).
Entman, supra note 28, at 52 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
For a discussion of John Marshall’s service in the Revolutionary War, see generally
CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1996); JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL,
AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES (2002); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN
MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1996).
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scope of its authority. The passage’s structure causes the reader to
make a choice: to side with John Marshall and the founding of America or to reject those principles in favor of the decision of the National
League Court majority.
The theme of Justice Brennan’s dissent is that the majority has
usurped the role of the political process by claiming that judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is a legitimate restraint on Con64
gress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause power. He assembles a col65
66
lection of materials including academic publications, case law,
67
68
congressional debates of the Bill of Rights, and legal treatises as
precedential authority to support his contention that the “sole design
[of the Tenth Amendment] is to exclude any interpretation, by which
69
other powers should be assumed beyond those which are granted.”
Brennan concludes his argument by invoking the 1937 Court-Packing
Plan, suggesting that the majority in National League is simply disguising its political preferences in constitutional garb, an effort unbefitting justices of the Supreme Court who hold their unelected positions
solely by virtue of their legal integrity and institutional conscience:
Today’s repudiation of this unbroken line of precedents that firmly reject
my Brethren’s ill-conceived abstraction can only be regarded as a transparent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with which they
disagree. The only analysis even remotely resembling that adopted today
is found in a line of opinions dealing with the Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment that ultimately provoked a constitutional crisis for the
Court in the 1930’s. We tend to forget that the Court invalidated legislation during the Great Depression, not solely under the Due Process
Clause, but also and primarily under the Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment. It may have been the eventual abandonment of that overly

64
65
66

67

68
69

Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 858 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 862 (citing FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY,
AND WAITE 39–40 (1937)).
Id. at 861 n.4, 862, 863 & n.5 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975);
Fry, 421 U.S. at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
404–07 (1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 324–25 (1816)).
Id. at 863 n.5 (citing 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 123, 131 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); 3
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 450, 464, 600 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 140, 148
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 432, 761, 767–68 (1789) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834)).
Id. (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
612 §§ 1907–1908 (2d ed. 1851)).
Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1908 (2d ed. 1851)).
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restrictive construction of the commerce power that spelled defeat for the Courtpacking plan, and preserved the integrity of this institution, but my Brethren
today are transparently trying to cut back on that recognition of the
scope of the commerce power. My Brethren’s approach to this case is
not far different from the dissenting opinions in the cases that averted
70
the crisis.

The rhetorical strategies embedded in Brennan’s reference to the
1937 Court-packing incident function on two levels. First, as a historical analogy, it appeals to logic or logos. It provides the reader with a
cause-and-effect lens through which to view the National League
Court’s majority decision. By comparing the 1976 Court’s decisionmaking to that of the 1930s Court, Brennan guides the reader to the
following conclusion: if the 1930s Court’s constrained interpretation
of the commerce power led to a constitutional crisis averted only by
its eventual abandonment of that interpretation, and if the 1976
Court’s majority decision parallels that initially constrained interpretation, then the 1976 decision will lead to a similar constitutional crisis.
The second function of this passage is to evoke pathos, i.e., to persuade by appealing to the emotion of the audience. The key emotive
word of the passage is “crisis.” The passage constructs a narrative of
fear and abatement around this word. First, Brennan links the two
Courts through their “ill-conceived” analyses, both of which are
grounded in a politically-driven interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. This interpretation “provoked a constitutional crisis for the
71
Court in the 1930’s.” After the fear is established, the passage offers
the strategy for abatement, a release from crisis: “abandonment of
72
that overly restrictive construction . . . .” This structure compliments
Brennan’s position, which is that the Court’s sharp interpretive turn
in 1937 is what preserved the institution’s integrity, rather than what
called it into question. Note also that the term “Court-packing” is itself pejorative, as it suggests that the President, to safeguard his New
Deal agenda, must change the voting arithmetic on the Court by increasing the number of justices and filling the new positions with
those who support his policies. In this way, court-packing is the judicial equivalent of ballot box stuffing. It signifies a blatant effort to
bend the rules—to cheat—when one cannot win any other way.
Brennan’s use of the Court-Packing Plan language reveals a fundamental assumption underlying his interpretation and articulation
70
71
72

Id. at 867–68 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 868.
Id.
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of the 1937 Court’s behavior. Specifically, Brennan needs his readers
to accept a priori that the Court’s survival as a legitimate government
institution required that the Court abandon the “overly restrictive
73
construction of the commerce power.” The Court’s acceptance of a
new construction of the commerce power preserved the integrity of
the Court in terms of raw institutional power, i.e., it stopped (defeated) the Court-Packing Plan, an unprecedented and destabilizing
challenge to the Court’s independence. In this sense, the term
“Court-Packing Plan” signifies an external threat to the Court, precipitated by Court decisions that are out of sync with political reality.
Reference to a historical event is often an effective strategy for
supporting an argumentative position. It immediately establishes a
connection between the writer and the reader, providing a common
starting point from which to process and evaluate the writer’s claims
and assertions. How a writer frames the historical event, however, reveals much about how the writer understands and perceives the event
itself. The 1937 Court-Packing Plan as a historical episode allows it to
function as a linguistic trope. Supreme Court Justices like Frankfurter and Brennan have appropriated the episode and adopted the
“Court-Packing Plan” language as part of an argument strategy that
functions as protective cover for the Court. The “Court-Packing
Plan” language reminds the reader of a time when the political
branches attacked the institutional hegemony of the federal judiciary.
It elicits both a logical and emotional response from the reader that
emphasizes the importance of judicial institutional integrity both in
terms of independence and constitutional decision-making authority.
III. REFERENCE TO THE SWITCH IN TIME TO ADVANCE AN ARGUMENT
ABOUT JUDICIAL INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY
As with any narrative, there are two sides to the events surrounding Roosevelt’s attempt to reorganize the Supreme Court story. So
far, this Article has considered what some judicial writers mean when
they refer to this event as the “Court-Packing Plan.” It is now time to
consider the alternate characterization of the 1937 event: “the switch
in time that saved nine.” This section will discuss how this alternate
choice in phrasing signifies a critique of cynical or unprincipled judicial decision-making where a Justice employs whatever legal analysis
will produce the policy outcome he or she prefers. By its very nature,
this critique also implicates the debate over the proper scope of judi73

Id.
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cial review. For those who use the “switch in time” language, the
Court’s occasional lapses into policymaking masked as judicial interpretation threatens the judiciary’s legitimacy and its place within the
Constitution’s tripartite system. In this way, the term “switch in time”
operates as a trope to signify an internal threat to the Court, a corrosive force within the judicial chamber itself.
As I will show, however, the “switch in time” language is not always
used in the same way or for the same ends. Sometimes a judicial
writer will deploy “switch in time” to refer to a cynical shift in the
Court’s position with respect to a certain issue. Those who take this
position generally think that the anti-New Deal decisions of the
Hughes Court were grounded in sound legal methodology, i.e., the
doctrine of stare decisis and the text of the Constitution itself. Under
this view, the “obstinacy” of the Hughes Court strengthened rather
than undermined the integrity of the judicial branch. According to
this perspective, it was not until Justice Owen Roberts “flipped” his
74
vote in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish and created a pro-New Deal majority that the Court’s integrity as a judicial body came into question.
Whether perceived as an act of institutional self-preservation or as judicial “flip-flopping” at its analytical worst, the “switch in time” represents to some the kind of outcome-driven decision-making that has
no place in a law court.
United States v. Kitsch is an example of a judicial writer’s choice to
use the phrase “switch in time” that saved nine to refer to the 1937
75
episode. In Kitsch, a grand jury had voted to indict William J. Kitsch
on “two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm” and “one
count of being a violent felon in possession of body armor” in viola76
tion of federal law. Kitsch filed a motion to dismiss his indictment,
claiming the federal law regulations were outside the scope of Con77
gress’s Commerce Clause power. Although the district court denied
Kitsch’s motion and upheld Congress’s action to prohibit felony pos78
session of firearms and body armor under the Commerce Clause,
the judge’s opinion cited with approval two recent Supreme Court
79
80
cases—United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison —that
74
75
76
77
78

79
80

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
307 F. Supp. 2d 657, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id. at 660–61. The statutory language required that the firearm must have traveled
through interstate commerce (at least once) and the body armor must be “sold or offered
for sale, in interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. at 661.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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reigned in congressional power under the Commerce Clause. For
our purposes, this case represents an opportunity to analyze what the
choice of the “switch in time” language may reveal about the rhetorical significance attached to that particular phrase.
In Kitsch, the judicial writer, Judge Stewart R. Dalzell of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, elects
not to refer to the 1937 episode as the “Court-Packing Plan” and instead employs the “switch in time” language. Specifically, he indicates that the holdings in Lopez and Morrison represent a long overdue
return to the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the early 1930s,
when the Court routinely set aside New Deal legislation for going be82
yond the commerce powers articulated in the Constitution. Judge
Dalzell’s text represents the idea that the Court was at its principled
best during this period, bravely maintaining the delicate balance between the judiciary and the political branches. This balance was then
upset by Justice Owens and his “switch in time,” which ushered in
more than fifty years of federal aggrandizement under the Commerce Clause:
“[t]he Court’s holdings in Lopez and Morrison . . . emphasized the limits of the commerce power in ways unseen
83
since the famous ‘switch in time.’”
As discussed in Part II, the “Court-Packing Plan” phrase tends to
be used to identify unauthorized or unwanted attacks on the judiciary
from outside, i.e., from the political branches. That is, writers typically employ the “Court-Packing Plan” language when: (a) challenging
an ultra vires action of the President or Congress or (b) issuing a
warning that such an action may occur if the Court does not alter its
current course. By contrast, writers use the “switch in time” language
to critique the behavior of the Court. The “switch” language choice
reframes the historical episode from an attack on what was done to
the Court (by President Roosevelt’s reorganization proposal) to an
indictment of what the 1937 Hughes Court did in response. Thus,
for example, when Judge Dalzell writes approvingly of the Court’s recent decisions in Lopez and Morrison, he means to: (a) draw a sharp
distinction between the then-current Court and the Courts that occupied the supreme bench between 1937 and 1995, and (b) connect

81

82
83

Kitsch, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 659 (“The Court continued to interpret the Commerce Clause
expansively in the years after Scarborough, but eventually, in the seminal case of United
States v. Lopez, it signaled a renewed interest in identifying the outer reaches of the commerce power. . . . Morrison again demonstrated the Court’s reinvigorated commitment to
enforcing constitutional limits on legislative power . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 659–61.
Id. at 660.
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the Lopez and Morrison Courts to the Hughes Court of the early 1930s,
which Dalzell considers more juridically principled. The reference to
the “famous switch in time” operates as both a temporal and jurisprudential boundary: it symbolizes the precise moment the Court
lost its way and became the great rationalizer for federal intrusion into the rights of the states.
Here, the purpose of referencing the 1937 event is not to remind
the reader of a moment when the President tried to destroy the judiciary’s independence, thereby jeopardizing the institutional structure
supported by separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. Rather, the reference signifies that the Court, when it shifted
its position in 1937 in West Coast Hotel, deviated from the proper
standards of constitutional interpretive methodology by substituting
external political pressure for legal principle.
That the writer believes the Court’s interpretive misconduct has
been institutionalized is revealed by Dalzell’s use of the word “un84
seen.” Broadly construed, “unseen” may be directed at the Court en
masse. In other words, the text embeds an implication that the interpretive principles underlying the Supreme Court’s 1995 and 2000
decisions in Lopez and Morrison, respectively, limiting congressional
power have not been seen since the pre-1937 Hughes Court. This interpretation invites the reader to consider the nature of the Court
from an ideological perspective, i.e., the 1995 and 2000 Supreme
Court has appropriately returned to the constitutional principles that
guided the conservative Court in 1936. The ideological overlay implies that during the intervening fifty-nine years, the Court operated
in a politically-driven, legally unprincipled way, at least when confronted with Commerce Clause questions.
As I will show in the next section of this Article, however, the
“switch in time” trope has also been used to argue in favor of overturning prior decisions that the author believes were driven by the
value judgments of the Justices rather than by sound legal reasoning.
In this sense, the “switch in time” represents a positive judicial response, a necessary internal corrective to the Court’s previous errors
of legal judgment.

84

Id.
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IV. COMPETING FRAME ANALYSIS: REFINING THE TROPES TO CRITIQUE
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS TO THE JUDICIARY
This section analyzes the extent to which the two previously discussed institutional arguments supported by the 1937 Court-packing
episode—the judicial “independence” and the judicial “interpretive
methodology” arguments—have developed. In this section, I conduct a framing analysis of the 1937 event as referenced by judicial
writers in two separate opinions within the same Supreme Court case,
85
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. I first looked
at how the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
framed the episode. Next, I looked at how Justice Scalia framed the
same episode in his concurrence/dissent. This analysis finds that
while judicial writers continue to choose between the “Court-packing”
and “switch in time” language, with the former focusing on the judiciary’s institutional autonomy from the political branches and the latter focusing on the judiciary’s interpretive autonomy within itself, the
use of the competing frames has developed into more nuanced arguments about protecting the Court against external versus internal
threats to judicial autonomy. The implication of this development is
to increase the symbolic power and rhetorical significance of the
1937 episode.
A. Case Summary: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey
86

In Casey, abortion clinics and physicians brought a Due Process
Clause challenge to five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Con87
trol Act of 1982 (“PACA”). The amendments to PACA required,
among other things, that a woman give her informed consent before
the procedure and after a twenty-four-hour waiting period within
88
which she was to receive certain contemplative information. Another provision required the informed consent of one of the parents of a
minor seeking the procedure, providing for a judicial bypass if the
minor either wished to proceed without parental consent or could
89
not obtain it. In addition, the PACA amendments provided that,
except in certain circumstances, a married woman must submit a

85
86
87
88
89

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–45 (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the Court).
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–3220 (1990).
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990).
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(c) (1990).

82

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:1

written statement that she notified her spouse of her intent to have
90
the procedure.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions, striking down only that part of the PACA that required spous91
al notification. And while Casey reaffirmed a woman’s fundamental
right to decide “whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” as rec92
ognized in Roe v. Wade, the Casey plurality articulated that it was only
93
preserving “the essential holding” of Roe. Thus, the Casey Court rejected the Roe trimester framework and replaced it with a new “undue
burden” standard by which to analyze the validity of all abortion re94
strictions.
The decision in Casey was the product of a highly fractured Court,
resulting in the unusual circumstance of a joint opinion crafted and
95
authored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
In Casey,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas applied a rational basis standard of review and voted to overrule Roe and
96
uphold all of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
Justice Blackmun applied strict scrutiny and argued that the Court
should uphold Roe in its entirety and strike down all of the PACA
97
amendments. Justice Stevens also applied a variation of the joint
98
opinion’s “undue burden” standard, endorsed Roe, and voted to
99
strike down most but not all of the PACA amendments. Amid these
extremes, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter issued a joint
opinion. Their opinion neither overruled nor preserved undisturbed
90
91
92
93
94

95
96

97

98

99

18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3209 (1990).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the Court).
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 870, 871 (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the
Court).
Id. at 877–78. Under this standard, the Court asks whether a state abortion regulation
has the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden,” defined as a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” Id. at
878.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 944, 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A woman’s interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.”).
Id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our precedents and
the joint opinion’s principles require us to subject all non-de-minimus abortion regulations
to strict scrutiny. Under this standard, the Pennsylvania statute’s provisions . . . must be
invalidated.”).
Id. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In my opinion . . . [a]
burden may be ‘undue’ either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational justification.”).
Id. at 912, 917 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Roe v. Wade and established the undue burden legal standard, a mid100
point between rational basis and strict scrutiny. With this basic understanding of the facts and the different positions of the Justices, the
rest of this section focuses on the competing frames of the 1937
Court episode used in the O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joint
opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurrence/dissent.
B. The Joint Opinion: Using the “Court-Packing” Frame to Critique
External Threats to Judicial Independence
As indicated by the above case summary, the immediate question
for the Court in Casey was whether various requirements added to
Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act violated a woman’s constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy as announced in Roe v. Wade.
However, the larger issue with which the Court dealt was whether it
should overrule Roe. This larger issue required the Court to articulate its views on the importance of precedent and its understanding
of the function and application of stare decisis. The reference to the
1937 event in the joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter occurs in that portion of the opinion that deals with stare de101
cisis.
The joint opinion discusses stare decisis in three parts. The first
part acknowledges that adherence to precedent is not absolute, sets
forth criteria to determine when deviation from precedent is war102
ranted, and analyzes Roe based on that criteria.
The second part
compares Roe with “two . . . decisional lines from the past century”
that are “of comparable dimension” to Roe wherein the Court did

100

101

102

Id. at 874 (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the Court) (“The fact that a law
which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the [abortion] right itself, has
the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman’s ability to make the decision does the power of the State reach into
the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
Id. at 854, 854–69 (“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test
the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to
gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”).
Id. at 855 (“So in this case we may enquire whether Roe’s central rule has been found unworkable; whether the rule’s limitation on state power could be removed without serious
inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it; whether the law’s growth in the intervening years has left Roe’s central rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society; and whether Roe’s premises of
fact have so far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding
somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.”).
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103

overrule precedent.
In the third part, the Court justifies its decision not to overrule Roe in its entirety by describing the dangers inherent in: (1) frequent overruling of precedent and (2) overruling
“under fire” a “watershed decision” meant to moderate “contending
104
sides of a national controversy.”
The reference to the 1937 event
occurs in the second part of this discussion. The following analysis is
therefore limited to that part of the joint opinion.
The plurality identifies two instances where the Court overruled
precedent and proceeds to distinguish those instances from the cur105
rent case. The two instances the plurality examined were: (1) West
106
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, where in 1937, the Court overruled Adkins
107
108
v. Children’s Hospital and (2) Brown v. Board of Education, where in
109
1954, the Court overruled Plessy v. Ferguson.
The plurality argued,
“West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding
of facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifica110
tions for the earlier constitutional resolutions.”
Thus, the Court
operated completely within its authority when overturning cases
111
where the original factual assumptions were false or had changed.
For example, the Court in Brown was justified in overruling Plessy because the socio-racial assumptions underlying that decision no longer
obtained.112 The same is true of Adkins, which was effectively over113
ruled by West Coast Hotel following the 1937 Court-packing episode.
Specifically, the plurality argues that the Court had a duty to overturn
Adkins because the economic assumptions giving rise to that decision
114
no longer existed in fact. The plurality pointed out, however, that

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

112
113

114

Id. at 861, 861–64.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 861.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the
Court).
Id. at 864 (“In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances
may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision [Brown and West Coast Hotel] to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s
constitutional duty.”).
347 U.S. 483, 490–92 (1954).
Id. at 861–62 (“As Justice Jackson wrote of the constitutional crisis of 1937 shortly before
he came on the bench: ‘The older world of laissez faire was recognized everywhere outside the Supreme Court to be dead.’” (quoting JACKSON, supra note 2, at 85)).
Id. at 862 (“[T]he clear demonstration that the facts of economic life [by the time of West
Coast Hotel] were different from those previously assumed [in Adkins] warranted the repudiation of the old law.”).
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the conditions requiring this kind of reversal were not present in the
115
current case.
The main theme advanced by the plurality’s discussion of stare
decisis is legitimacy. Indeed, the plurality premised its analysis of acceptable deviation from stare decisis on the idea that the Court retains its legitimacy when it overturns cases that are based on false factual assumptions:
The facts upon which [Adkins] had premised a constitutional resolution
of social controversy had proven to be untrue, and history’s demonstration of their untruth not only justified but required the new choice of
constitutional principle that West Coast Hotel announced. Of course, it
was true that the Court lost something by its misperception, or its lack of
prescience, and the Court-packing crisis only magnified the loss; but the
clear demonstration that the facts of economic life were different from
116
those previously assumed warranted the repudiation of the old law.

What is noteworthy here is the subtlety with which the plurality uses
the linguistic trope of the “Court-packing” language to advance its
argument about protecting institutional independence. Earlier analysis of the “Court-packing” phrase in this Article argued that the
phrase is typically used in situations where the judiciary perceives itself in a defensive posture vis-à-vis the political branches. Invoking
the “Court-packing” language is meant to trigger a sympathetic response in the reader of wanting to secure and protect the judicial institution from encroachment by Congress or the President. The Casey
plurality’s use of the “Court-packing” phrase expands on this initial
idea of protection from external threat.
There is a fine line between hegemonic and independent. As you
move toward the first, you risk losing the second. Here, the ultimate
goal is to defend judicial independence. However, the Casey plurality
is presented with a situation where it must make a principled argument as to why overruling precedent in some instances secures the
Court’s legitimacy while in others, overruling precedent damages it.
Complicating this predicament is the fact that each response—
overruling and not overruling precedent—must be judicially driven
and based on sound legal reasoning. The plurality navigates this difficulty by acknowledging the dichotomy between hegemony and independence. The use of the “Court-packing” phrase externally locates the source of the deviation from stare decisis outside of the
115

116

Id. at 864 (“Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe’s central holding nor our
understanding of it has changed . . . the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the
prior law with any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973.”).
Id. at 862.
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judiciary: the reason that the Court is justified in overruling precedent is because society’s understanding of the facts underpinning the
prior decisions has changed. Given this circumstance, the Court is
presented with two options. It can either unilaterally impose a factual
understanding of a reality that no longer exists or it can adapt to society’s modified understanding of its reality. The former jeopardizes
the Court’s legitimacy by suggesting the judiciary is exercising unauthorized domination over the other branches, while the latter secures
the credibility of the Court as an institution and promotes acceptance
of judicial independence. The plurality’s use of the “Court-packing”
language works to maintain the focus on external changes outside of
the Court.
C. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence/Dissent: Using the “Switch in Time”
Frame to Critique the Internal Behavior of the Court
Like the joint opinion, Justice Scalia’s concurrence/dissent in Casey focuses on the Court’s legitimacy. However, whereas the joint
opinion deployed the term “Court-Packing Plan” to signify external
threats to the Court as an institution, Scalia uses the term “switch in
time” to signify certain behaviors internal to the Court that jeopardize
its legitimacy as a judicial body. Scalia attacks the plurality opinion
for retaining aspects of Roe that Scalia believes are founded on defective legal reasoning. These, he argues, should be abandoned lest they
persist and damage the integrity of the Court. To make his point,
Scalia calls on—and then distinguishes—two landmark cases in the
117
Court’s jurisprudential history, Dred Scott v. Sandford and West Coast
118
Hotel Co. v. Parrish:
[T]he Court was covered with dishonor and deprived of legitimacy by
Dred Scott v. Sandford, an erroneous (and widely opposed) opinion that it
did not abandon, rather than by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, which
produced the famous “switch in time” from the Court’s erroneous (and
widely opposed) constitutional opposition to the social measures of the
119
New Deal.

As this passage attests, for Scalia the 1937 “switch in time” saved
the Court from dishonor—dishonor caused by allowing economic
philosophy to dictate judicial interpretation. Therefore, according to
Scalia, the Court’s shift in 1937 was prompted not by the threats
posed by President Roosevelt, but by the Court’s recognition of its
117
118
119

60 U.S. 393 (1856).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 998 (Scalia, Rehnquist, C.J., White, Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).
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own flawed reasoning in the earlier New Deal Cases. The issue, then,
as framed by Scalia, is whether the plurality opinion in Casey more
closely resembles Dred Scott or West Coast Hotel.
Scalia is quick in his answer. He portrays the plurality opinion as
a mere expression of the particular values of the three Justices who
drafted it, not as a judicial position derived through the application
of established legal doctrine: “the best the Court can do to explain
how it is that the word ‘liberty’ must be thought to include the right
to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that
120
simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice.”
In Scalia’s view, the plurality opinion in Casey perpetuates the interpretive errors first articulated in Roe; and because Roe functions as
a legal mask to “a political choice,” it is unprincipled and dangerous
to the judiciary. By refusing to abandon Roe, the plurality in Casey
leaves a wrong-headed decision in place—an act (or omission) similar
to letting Dred Scott stand even after it was shown to be legally indefensible. What reproductive rights law needs, according to Scalia, is
not the continuation of Roe (however altered), but a “switch in time”
that returns the Court to its proper and limited role as the interpreter of legal texts, for there is danger in yielding to unrestrained or unprincipled methods of judicial decision-making:
As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices
were doing essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discerning our society’s traditional understanding of that text—the public pretty
much left us alone. . . . [I]f, as I say, our pronouncement of constitutional law rests primarily on value judgments, then a free and intelligent
people’s attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite dif121
ferent.

For Scalia, the key to maintaining the Court’s legitimacy is proper judicial behavior. The Court damages its legitimacy when individual
justices abandon legal principle to advance a policy preference.
As indicated above, Scalia uses the term “switch in time” as a linguistic trope to target judicial behavior. This is consistent with the
examples previously analyzed in this Article. However, Scalia adds an
additional layer of complexity to the trope. He writes that the interpretive turn created by the “switch in time” was in response to “the
Court’s erroneous (and widely opposed) constitutional opposition to

120

121

Id. at 983; see also id. at 1000 (“[P]ermeat[ing] today’s opinion [is] a new mode of constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text and traditional practice to determine the
law, but upon what the Court calls ‘reasoned judgment,’ which turns out to be nothing
but philosophical predilection and moral intuition.” (internal citation omitted)).
Id. at 1000–01.
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122

the social measures of the New Deal.” Ironically, however, the 1937
Court’s decision in West Coast ushered in an era of expanded federal
123
power under the Commerce Clause —something Scalia has typically
124
opposed during his tenure on the bench. Given his constitutional
conservatism, it seems incongruous for Scalia to cite favorably to a judicial moment that expanded the reach of the federal government.
However, in this case, he is citing to West Coast for a limited and specific purpose—to encourage the Court to overrule what he believes
was an ill-reasoned precedent: Roe v. Wade. Use of the “switch in
time” language allows Scalia to take a core judicial moment, which is
fundamental to the social welfare legislation of the New Deal, and
turn it on its head to support a politically conservative position.
Framed in this context, those who support the 1937 interpretive shift
produced by the “switch in time” likewise must support the overturning of Roe.
***
The dominant theme of both the joint opinion and Justice Scalia’s
concurrence/dissent is the legitimacy of the Court. However, the two
opinions do not locate the danger to the Court’s legitimacy in the
same place. The plurality focuses on external threats to the judiciary
that arise when the Court’s factual assumptions no longer comport
with social reality, thus raising the hackles of the President and/or
Congress; if the Court does not direct its jurisprudence to the new
factual paradigm, it risks being marginalized by the political branches

122
123

124

Id. at 998.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938 against challenges under the Commerce Clause and Fifth Amendment);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 against a Commerce Clause challenge).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., jointly dissenting) (“The striking case of Wickard v. Filburn, which
held that the economic activity of growing wheat, even for one’s own consumption, affected commerce sufficiently that it could be regulated, always has been regarded as the
ne plus ultra of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence. To go beyond that, and to say
the failure to grow wheat (which is not an economic activity, or any activity at all) nonetheless affects commerce and therefore can be federally regulated, is to make mere breathing in and out the basis for federal prescription and to extend federal power to virtually
all human activity.” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (holding that a regulation subjecting private individuals and companies to suit for
gender-motivated violent torts is beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a regulation banning possession of
firearms within a public school zone is beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power).
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and/or the public. In this way, the term “Court-Packing Plan” signifies the kind of external pressure that is applied to the Court when it
does not react quickly enough to the ground shifting beneath its feet.
Conversely, Scalia focuses on the fundamental internal threat to
the Court’s legitimacy, namely judicial behavior that is driven by value choices rather than by legal doctrine. For Scalia, there is (or
should be) a purity to the act of applying the law, one which must be
maintained for the Court to remain legitimate. When a particular
Court—or a majority of Justices—loses its way and begins to make judicial decisions based on policy preferences instead of established legal rules, the Court must self-correct to save the only claim it has to
authority: its public image as a learned but apolitical body of legal
experts. Therefore, the Court, at various times in its history, has
made—and will continue to make—the rare “switch in time” to reset
its internal balance and find the proper mode of judicial behavior.
Notwithstanding their contrary arguments, each of the two Casey
opinions discussed above invoked the 1937 institutional clash between the President and the Supreme Court to support its position.
That each was able to effectively do so is a product of the fact that two
distinct linguistic tropes have developed around the 1937 episode: a
“Court-packing” trope to direct at external threats to the judiciary
and a “switch in time” trope to direct at the members of the bench.
CONCLUSION
The federal courts have recognized that the 1937 Court-Packing
Plan event is a powerful rhetorical tool. Accordingly, they have created institutional and methodological arguments grounded in the institutional clash. Justices and judges have framed the event as the
“Court-Packing Plan” to denote the institutional struggle for power
and credibility between the judiciary and external threats to its legitimacy. The broader issue associated with the “Court-Packing Plan”
language seems to be protecting the integrity of the judicial institution and the independence of the judiciary. This framing views judicial institutional autonomy as fundamental and essential to the success of our scheme of government.
Conversely, some Justices and judges have framed the event as
“the switch in time that saved nine” to denote the institutional struggle within the judiciary for power and credibility related to the scope
of its interpretive constitutional decision-making authority. This
framing views the 1937 episode as a cautionary tale about the dangers
to the Court’s legitimacy brought on by internal judicial behavior.
The “switch in time” framing submits that the interpretive turn in
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1937 changed how we understand the scope and limitations of constitutional interpretation, creating the potential, if unrestrained, to not
only damage the Court, but also damage our entire system of government.
The purpose of this Article is to show how a rhetorical orientation
helps us to understand how the Court-Packing Plan episode—
through language choice—has entered our culture of argument
about our system of government and the role of the judiciary as a
constitutional decision-making body within that system. The manner
in which these language tropes are used is complex and, at least on
the surface, can confound one’s initial assumptions about the writer
who has selected them. Nevertheless, the effort is usually worth the
sweat, because a deep analysis of these tropes reveals meanings we
may have overlooked. We have seen that when judicial writers refer
to the Court-Packing Plan or to the switch in time, they are almost always addressing the Court’s legitimacy and the threats to that legitimacy. As it happens, those threats can be external or internal to the
Court, and the tropes discussed in this Article—“ Court-Packing Plan”
and “switch in time”—help us to understand which one is being
framed by the author.

